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Territoriality and Citizenship: 
Membership and Sub-State Polities in Post-Yugoslav Space 
 
Dejan Stjepanović, University of Edinburgh1 
 
Abstract 
This paper deals with the issue of sub-state citizenship in the post-Yugoslav 
countries and focuses on the emergence and definitions of membership in sub-state 
polities. The paper analyses conceptions of nationhood and territorial compositions 
of these states, proceeds with the analysis of sub-state entities’ governance 
arrangements as a part of the states’ citizenship regimes and compares conceptions 
of nationhood and membership in state-wide and sub-state polities. The paper 
identifies four broad categories of sub-state polities and two diverging tendencies in 
the definition of membership in those. At one end of the spectrum, there are cases in 
which membership in regional polities is based on territorial, multi-ethnic and civic 
principles. At the other end, membership is defined in ethno-national terms.   
 
Keywords: 
Citizenship, territories, membership, sub-state citizenship, polities, post-Yugoslav 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, there has been increasing academic interest in issues related to 
citizenship in the states emerging from the break-up of the socialist Yugoslav 
federation. However, the relationship between territorial politics and citizenship, 
especially in terms of membership, identity and governance arrangements has yet to 
receive significant scholarly attention. Sub-state regions and autonomous 
municipalities as particular forms of territorialised political communities have been 
only marginally addressed in the literature on the former Yugoslavia and South East 
Europe. This paper aims to elucidate the complexity of sub-state polities in the post-
Yugoslav macro region, in particular the differences and similarities in the 
constructions of political membership at state and sub-state levels. It shows why and 
how definitions of membership differ and what polity specific issues, as regards 
formal and substantive aspects of citizenship, arise at different spatial levels (e.g. 
state and sub-state). 
By dealing with sub-state polities the paper is not suggesting that further 
fragmentation of the post-Yugoslav space, such as the dissolution of current states, is 
likely to take place. Rather, it argues that there are nested polities and memberships 
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at various spatial levels within one formal citizenship regime, not unlike in other 
European states. Most often sovereign states have primacy in determining legal 
citizenship,2 the legal bond between an individual and a state, but citizenship is 
meaningful at the sub-state level as well. Sub-state self-governing territories can 
have separate legal systems or deliver certain public goods that in other contexts 
would be provided by the central state; thus we can talk about sub-state or regional 
citizenship.  
The aim of this paper is primarily to identify sub-state polities (and some 
more prominent attempts to build those) in the post-Yugoslav context and show the 
criteria of membership in each of them. The paper does not attempt to enumerate all 
the possible differentiated rights and duties the members of these sub-state entities 
are affected by.  These can be subject matter of some future case studies. The current 
paper makes general references to these rights in regards to membership criteria and 
the principles on which the polities are established. The paper is conceived as an 
overview rather than an in-depth analysis of the cases.  
Following a theoretical synopsis, the paper is divided into two sections. The 
first one analyses the emergence of seven states in the post-Yugoslav space as well as 
conceptions of nationhood including the territorial composition of each individual 
state. The second section focuses on sub-state polities and their particulars. In the 
first section, nation and state building processes in the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav 
era are briefly contextualised. The territorial arrangements of the current states are 
explained as well. They are broadly conceived as governance arrangements of a 
state-wide polity constituting a part of a citizenship regime. Utilising the concept of 
nationhood, the paper will show if and what type of territory-nationhood correlates 
exist in each of the cases. The second section looks at examples of sub-state territorial 
polities (failed or successful) in those states. Due to their large number, the cases are 
grouped into four broadly conceived categories on the basis of the most dominant 
features in the process of construction of sub-state polities. These features include 
not only ethnic versus territorially defined membership criteria but also the actual 
modes of institutionalisation of self-governing units. In other words, those sub-state 
polities in which self-governing institutions were established by bottom-up 
democratic processes are juxtaposed with top-down, imposed self-governance 
arrangements in the immediate post-conflict setting. Another important feature used 
is the existence or lack of a historical precedent for the sub-state polity.  
The concluding section of this paper offers a comparative analysis between 
territorially legitimised and ethno-nationally defined political communities. The 
paper identifies two diverging tendencies in the construction of sub-state polities. At 
one end of the spectrum, there are cases in which membership in sub-state polities is 
                                                 
 
2 There are some exceptions to this general rule, such as in the cases of Swiss cantons and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s entities that do regulate and/or manage citizenship acquisition processes to various 
degrees.  
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based on territorial and civic principles. At the other end, in harmony with the logic 
of the majority of nation-states in the Balkans, membership is defined by references 
to ethnicity. The paper shows that in the post-Yugoslav space there is a limited 
toleration of sub-state polities that have civic membership criteria. At the same time, 
ethnically legitimised sub-state political communities are frowned upon by central 
states that in most cases themselves use ethnic criteria of membership. In cases 
where ethnic sub-state polities are institutionally established, they are almost 
exclusively a result of the peace settlements, and most frequently, international 
involvement.  
 
2. Territories, Polities, Citizenship and Nationhood 
 
Citizenship, as generally understood today, involves political membership of equal 
individuals in a territorially bounded state. Historically speaking, polities, their 
membership criteria and relations to territory differed significantly from what is 
considered to be the norm today: an internally homogenous nation-state exercising 
full and unchallenged authority across its territory. The territorial state became the 
dominant model of political organisation in the eighteenth century. Long-lasting 
processes of state building testify to the victory of the national self-determination 
principle, which is especially true for the post-French revolution period during 
which “the transfer of the locus of sovereignty from crown to nation coincided with 
the transfer of the locus of citizenship from municipalities to the nation”.3 The 
historical goal of nation-building was not only to transfer sovereignty to the nation 
but often to dismantle other competing forms of political loyalties, identities and 
memberships including regional and local. As much as concepts of nation and state 
might be dominant, there is ample evidence that sub-state polities are not just messy 
relics of the pre-national European past but omnipresent expressions of modern 
democratic citizenship. Polities exist in various spaces including state and sub-state 
but also at supra-state and local levels. Territories at the same time are not limited to 
states only but are multiple and can be defined by political, functional or 
administrative criteria and are partially or fully overlapping.  
It has often been considered that territory must be held exclusively. 
According to this world view, states are compact and contiguous entities whose 
unchallenged power is legitimised by the principle of sovereignty, “the recognition 
of the claim by a state to exercise supreme authority over a clearly defined 
territory”.4 These state-centred approaches not only consider territory as something 
bounded and historically determined, but most commonly, assume that (nation-) 
                                                 
 
3 Andreas Fahrmeir and H.S. Jones, ‘Space and belonging in modern Europe: citizenship(s) in 
localities, regions, and states’, European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire Vol. 15, No. 3, 
June 2008, p. 244 
4 Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 28. 
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/22 
  
 
 
7 
states have exclusive powers across their territories in all domains of political and 
social life. However, territories, unlike physical spaces, are socially constructed, the 
results of an open-ended process with multiple parties involved, each with their own 
criteria for defining territories. Within the totality of territories we can easily discern 
functional entities from territorial units established for political purposes. A polity, a 
specific kind of political territorial unit, is “a politically organized society or 
community with its own institutions for making collectively binding decisions for a 
specified group of persons and/or within a bounded territory”.5 Based on that 
definition, polities can be smaller, larger or match the state’s spatial outreach.6  
Nevertheless, not all political territories are polities. Statistical territorial units, 
electoral units or territorially deconcentrated structures of central government could 
not be defined as polities. A polity implies a certain degree of autonomy in decision 
making and implementation of those decisions as well as accountability to the 
individual members of that community. As regards sub-state polities, federal units 
of federal state and autonomous regions are prime examples of polities. Stretching 
the concept further, municipalities enjoying certain reserved competencies can be 
considered polities, too. A degree of autonomy is essential for defining a territorially 
based sub-state polity as it allows it to extricate itself from some of the state-level 
cooperation arrangements without necessarily seceding from the state, something 
Bartolini calls “partial exit”7. Disengagement from state-level arrangements or partial 
exit can focus on cultural, fiscal, legislative and administrative aspects or can be 
more encompassing, resulting in various forms of autonomies and decentralised 
sub-state entities, symmetrically or asymmetrically integrated. For the purposes of 
this paper (in line with most of the literature on territorial politics8), a distinction 
between bottom-up initiatives and top-down creation of political (self-governing) 
territories will be made, while understanding that there is significant overlap and 
interaction between the two. Causes or motivations for the institutionalisation of a 
specific form of territorial governance arrangement (grass-root or top-down) can 
vary, but once autonomy and/or special representation have been established for a 
sub-state polity, “they come to be seen as elements of democratic citizenship”.9  
                                                 
 
5 Rainer Bauböck, ‘Multilevel citizenship and territorial borders in the EU polity’, IWE Working Paper 
No. 37, 2003, p.1. 
6 The primary focus of this paper is on polities with a dominant territorial dimension rather than 
those defined in another manner, such as diasporas or non-territorial minority autonomies. Polities 
could be defined with reference to the ‘people’ as well and not strictly by territorial references. The 
Ottoman millet system is a historic example of non-territorial, religiously defined sub-state polities. 
7 Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe: centre formation, system building and political structuring between 
the nation-state and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 4-12. 
8 On the relevant debate and the distinction between regionalism usually understood as a bottom-up 
and regionalisation as a top-down processes see Frans Schrijver, Regionalism after regionalisation: Spain,  
France and the United Kingdom (Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 
9 Rainer Bauböck, “Why Stay Together? A Pluralist Approach to Secession and Federation”, in Will  
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As mentioned, the notion of citizenship has evolved to be understood as 
membership in a state,10 but debates in citizenship studies on issues such as 
immigration in sub-state polities in Europe11 show that citizenship has spatial 
references not exclusively limited to the state or supra-state level polities. This 
‘nested citizenship constellation’ is characterised by overlapping of political 
memberships12 within one broader state (or supra-state as in the case of the EU) 
citizenship regime.13 Thus, the territorial organisation and division of powers as a 
part of state governance arrangements can help us understand the relations between 
polities at different spatial levels and definitions of membership in each of them 
which regulate who has a legitimate claim of belonging to a polity, symbolically, but 
above all by actively participating in determining its future and enjoying rights in it. 
For example, Scotland as a part of the United Kingdom does not have separate 
formal citizenship, but does possess legal and educational systems differentiated 
from the rest of the UK. Another example is the demilitarised Åland Islands in 
Finland, whose inhabitants are exempt from military service, while they still carry 
Finnish passports, because of a particular territorial arrangement within the state.  
These are obvious examples of differentiated citizenship across non-sovereign 
territorial entities, parts of larger states which illustrate the fact that citizens of a 
given state can have varied rights and duties depending on their status and 
membership in a sub-state polity.    
Rogers Smith offers a useable analytical framework focused on identity 
politics and its role in the construction of political ‘peoples’ and membership in 
polities (state, sub-state or supra-state). According to his theory, “political actors and 
movements advance an account of the community they wish to shape and lead that 
includes identifiable economic, political power and ethically constitutive stories”.14 
Public discourses, political and historical narratives but also the representations of a 
community’s past and future in founding documents, constitutions, statutes among 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p. 374. 
10 Christian Joppke, “Citizenship Between De- and Re- Ethnicization,” European Journal of Sociology /  
Archives Européennes de Sociologie 44, no. 3 (2003): 429-458. 
11 See Jo Shaw, “Political Rights and Multilevel Citizenship in Europe”, in Elspeth Guild et al., eds.,  
Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship, and Integration in the EU (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 
2009), pp. 29-49. 
12 Rainer Bauböck, “Cold constellations and hot identities: Political theory questions about 
transnationalism and diaspora”, in Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist, Diaspora and Transnationalism: 
Concepts, Theories and Methods (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), p. 302.  
13 The concept of citizenship regime “encompasses a range of different legal statuses, viewed in their 
wider political context, which are central to the exercise of civil rights, political membership and – in 
many cases – full socio-economic membership in a particular territory” See Jo Shaw and Igor Štiks, 
“The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia”, CITSEE 
Working Paper Series 2010/01, p 6. 
14 Rogers M. Smith, “The Politics of identities and the task of political Science” in Shapiro et al. 
Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 61. 
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others can be seen as ethically constitutive stories. These ethically constitutive stories 
are, in other words, definitions, claims and visions of a specific peoplehood, its 
boundaries and membership. Smith’s concept of peoplehood is comparable to 
Brubaker’s understanding of nationhood.15 Smith’s ethically constitutive stories and 
Brubaker’s idioms of nationhood are important legitimising narratives but should 
not be considered as the only or unmediated variable in explaining the outcomes of 
particular policies including citizenship regimes and the territorial structuring of 
states.16 Political struggles within a given polity and various factors including party 
politics, socio-economic development and macrohistorical processes of state building 
play crucial roles in the territorial composition of states. Another advantage of using 
Smith’s approach is that instead of being led astray by the dichotomous civic-ethnic 
nationalism divide, it might be more pertinent to identify the most common features 
of ethically constitutive stories which can indeed be dominated by ethnic or civic 
elements, but can also be multi-ethnic or relate to territorial references or the 
institutional history of a polity.  
 
3. States, Territories and Membership in the (post)-Yugoslav Context 
 
3.1. Historical background 
 
Undeniably, ethically constitutive stories used for defining membership at the state 
and sub-state politics in the former Yugoslav space are characterised by their overt 
references to ethnicity. In the 20th century, with the crystallisation of specific national 
projects tainted by ethno-religious criteria of membership, historically emerging 
territories lost some of their earlier allure. The dominance of the principle of self-
determination strengthened the arguments in favour of ethno-national 
independence/autonomy while historic polities could be gerrymandered to create 
ethnically ‘homogenous’ territories.  
The first common modern South Slavic state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes (later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), formed in 1918, struggled 
through its short interwar existence to achieve a viable agreement between the 
advocates of federalism and those promoting a centralised unitary state. The 
conceptions of political membership to a large degree corresponded to these rival 
visions of territorial arrangements. Formal legal citizenship and rights were 
unaffected by the territorial units that were established in 1929 as symmetric 
provinces (banovinas) which lacked both historical precedents and also clear ethnic 
                                                 
 
15 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press,  
2004), p. 10. 
16 In a recent co-authored article Brubaker downplays the role of the ‘‘idioms of nationhood’’ 
especially the ‘‘straight-line’’ ethnic nationalist accounts as criticised by Joppke and Rosenhek (2002). 
See Rogers Brubaker and Jaeeun Kim. "Transborder Membership Politics in Germany and Korea" 
Archives européennes de sociologie/European Journal of Sociology 52.1 (2011): 21-75. 
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majorities, with the exception of the Drava Banovina which had a Slovene ethnic 
majority. In terms of ethically constitutive stories and nationhood promoted by the 
central state, membership was defined as belonging to ‘one nation with three names’ 
(Croat, Serb and Slovene). Not only did this conception not recognise other South 
Slavic ethnicities as distinct elements of the nation but it also excluded large non-
Slavic minorities from the equation e.g. Albanians, Germans and Hungarians.17 As a 
result of the rising centre-periphery disputes which tended to correspond to ethnic 
cleavages, the asymmetrically autonomous Croatian Banovina was created in 1939. 
Other peripheral demands were not met with corresponding autonomous territories. 
During World War II quasi-independent entities under Nazi and Fascist tutelage 
were formed while other territories were occupied and annexed by some of the 
neighbouring states. 
The territorial structure of the post WWII Yugoslav federation was to reflect 
the ethno-national diversity of its constituent South Slavic peoples/nations (narodi) 
and minorities/nationalities (narodnosti). It was envisaged that the narodi should 
achieve self-determination within the Yugoslav federation in which units of the 
federal state served as nation-states for their constitutional peoples.18 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) was the obvious exception to that rule; its borders conformed 
largely to their historic contours, it consisted initially of two, from the late 1960s, 
three, constituent narodi. 
Apart from BiH, another multi-ethnically and historically defined territory 
was the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina whose territory nearly matched the 
former Habsburg lands in Serbia. An additional case that could be interpreted as a 
departure from the strict mono-national republican principle was Croatia whose 
constitution(s) made references to Croats as the titular nation in the republic but also 
to Croatian Serbs. Thus, in some ways, Croatia could be considered a constitutionally 
bi-national republic19 at that time. Non-South-Slavic nations were not eligible 
candidates for their own republic neither as the sole bearers of the right to self-
determination nor in concord with another South Slavic group. Thus, the vociferous 
demands of Yugoslavia’s ethnic Albanians were not met with a relevant republican 
territorial framework. Instead, the oblast or region of Kosovo and Metohija was 
formed, later to be upgraded to the status of the autonomous province of Kosovo, 
                                                 
 
17 Charles Jelavich, “South Slav Education: Was there Yugoslavism?” in Norman M. Naimark and 
Holly Case (eds.), Yugoslavia and its historians: understanding the Balkan wars of the 1990s (Stanford 
University Press, 2003), p. 95. 
18 Steven L. Burg, “Republican and Provincial Constitution Making in Yugoslav Politics”, Publius: The  
Journal of Federalism, no. 12 (Winter), 1982, pp.131-153. 
19 Dejan Jović suggests that, Croatian Serbs, although numerically significantly smaller, were made  
‘constitutionally’ equal to Croats because of their suffering under the fascist Ustaša regime as well as  
their overrepresentation in the partisan movement and the Communist Party ranks. See Dejan Jović, 
“Reassessing Socialist Yugoslavia 1945-1990: The Case of Croatia”, in Dejan Djokić and James Ker-
Lindsay (eds.), New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011) pp. 117-142. 
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within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. There were some attempts during the initial 
period of territorial recomposing to establish a distinct territorial entity in the area of 
the ethnically heterogeneous historic region of Sandžak20 (either as a separate 
republic within the Yugoslav federation or as an autonomous province/region under 
BiH, Montenegro or Serbia). Despite this, Sandžak was divided between Montenegro 
and Serbia. Some also advocated the creation of an autonomous unit in Montenegro 
within the boundaries of the historic territories of the Bay of Kotor but those 
initiatives were never successful either.  
Overall, the internal borders of Yugoslavia were established by a combination 
of ethnic and historic principles. Sometimes historic principles trumped ethnic ones, 
as in the cases of BiH and Vojvodina, at other times, historic and ethnic criteria 
largely coincided as was the case with the border between Slovenia and Croatia, or 
were mainly ethnically defined as the border, for example, between Macedonia and 
Serbia. As a rule, these borders were the product of bargaining and contestation 
between various communist party elites (local, regional and state-wide).  
The 1974 Yugoslav constitution reaffirmed the Yugoslav-developed principle 
of self-management and also upgraded the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo so 
that it nearly matched the powers of the republics. This included, among other 
matters, the autonomous provinces’ direct representation at the federal level. The 
Constitution gave republics and autonomous provinces the opportunity to 
decentralise their competencies further to the ‘self-managing’ lower level 
communities21, a policy in many ways resembling the EU-promoted principle of 
subsidiarity. Based on the constitutional provisions for decentralisation, Croatia and 
Serbia Proper established a meso-level tier of government called zajednice 
općina22(associations of municipalities) in Croatia and međuopštinske regionalne 
zajednice (intermunicipal regional communities) in Serbia. These sub-state regional 
associations had relatively far-reaching powers and were established primarily 
through bottom-up initiatives, in line with the ideology of self-management.  
The territorial divisions of the Yugoslav federation played a prominent role in 
the process of its dissolution in the early 1990s. Faced with the challenges of 
competing claims to self-determination, the international community and EC-
appointed Arbitration (Badinter) Commission considered the territories of the six 
republics as legitimate candidates for independence, based on the principle of the uti 
possidetis juris. The borders of autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, 
according to the Commission were not to become internationally recognisable 
                                                 
 
20 Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist splits in Yugoslav Communism,  (Cornell University  
Press, 1988), pp. 99-107. 
21 The lowest level of local communities (known as mjesna/mesna zajednica/zaednica; mestna skupnost) 
was a neighbourhood-based association that not only proposed initiatives but managed issues of 
immediate concerns for local citizens. Similar divisions below the municipal level still exist in all post-
Yugoslav countries save Kosovo although with less substance than in Yugoslav times.  
22  Ustav Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske, (Zagreb: Narodne novine, 1974). 
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despite the fact that some of its recommendations were based on the reading of an 
article of the Yugoslav constitution referring to the inviolability of both republican 
and provincial borders.23  
 
3.2. State territorial structures and membership since 1990 
 
There has been an obvious departure from the decentralised self-management of 
Yugoslav times towards more territorial centralisation in independent states. This is 
coupled with the strengthening of ethno-national criteria of political membership 
across states. These are not necessarily competing logics and are common for many 
unitary nation-states. However, these developments have often caused significant 
tensions, especially in polities that used to be defined as bi/multi-national in pre-
1990 Yugoslavia. In those cases where the tensions resulted in protracted violent 
interethnic conflict and international mediation such as BiH and Kosovo (and to a 
lesser degree in Macedonia) there has been a tendency towards ethnic power-
sharing at the state level and/or creation of ethnically exclusive sub-state territorial 
polities. As independent states, Slovenia and Montenegro (including Macedonia 
especially in the 1990s) were organised as unitary centralised nation-states with no 
meso-level tier of government. Serbia went from being the most decentralised 
republic of socialist Yugoslavia to being highly centralised in the 1990s and showed 
only a limited degree of decentralisation in the 2000s as regards the (asymmetric) 
autonomous province of Vojvodina. In the 1990s Croatia instutionalised meso-level 
counties as a centralising response to centrifugal tendencies and not necessarily as an 
attempt to decentralise the state. A brief account of each case is given below.  
 
3.2.1. Slovenia 
 
When Slovenia declared its independence in 1991, it was the most ethnically 
homogenous of the Yugoslav republics. The largest portion of the border with its only 
(former) Yugoslav neighbour, Croatia, was historically permanent, and thus had a low 
potential for conflict. Tellingly, the border disputes between Slovenia and Croatia 
persist in the areas where borders were defined recently and/or by ethnic criteria. The 
                                                 
 
23 The opinion number 3 is based on the selective reading of the second and fourth paragraphs of 
Article  5 of the Constitution of SFRY that stipulated that the Republics’ territories and boundaries 
could not be altered without their consent. The same paragraphs reads further that “the territory of an 
autonomous province [cannot be changed] – without the consent of that autonomous province” and 
that “a border of an autonomous province [can only be changed] on the basis of its concurrence” 
(Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 4, Ustav SFRJ [Constitution of the SFRY], 1974). Interestingly, in 2009, the 
Croatian representative addressing the ICJ in the advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, made direct reference to the mentioned paragraphs of the SFRY constitution to argue 
that Kosovo possessed statehood in SFRY. See the ICJ verbatim record at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15724.pdf (last accessed 5 January 2012). 
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newly independent Slovenia was defined constitutionally as the country of all its 
citizens, but “based on the permanent and inalienable right of the Slovene nation to 
self-determination”.24 Idioms of nationhood were based on references to ethnic rather 
than civic or territorial principles of political membership.25 The new constitution also 
pledged to protect the rights of the numerically small autochthonous Italian and 
Hungarian minorities and guaranteed their political representation. In this sense there 
was no significant formal difference in how political membership of Slovenian polity 
was defined compared to socialist times. In practice, this led to curbing of the rights 
which the former constitutive narodi enjoyed under the Yugoslav constitutions. 
The internal territorial composition and regionalisation of Slovenia, echoes the 
conception of nationhood as unitary and undivided. Apart from the existence of local 
governments, an insignificant degree of administrative regionalisation is observable. 
Limited competences regarding the use of language and schooling for Hungarian and 
Italian minorities are devolved to a few designated municipalities. Although Slovenia 
is composed of the entirety or parts of the former Austrian crown lands of Carniola, 
Carinthia, Coastland (Österreichisches Küstenland), Styria and the ex-Hungarian region 
of Prekmurje, these do not possess regional institutions and were not considered as 
possible administrative or autonomous regions, either by noticeable grass-root 
regionalist movements26 or by the central government planning27 schemes. Proposals 
for possible polycentric decentralisation arrangements have focused on functional 
conurbations,28 but have not been enacted as yet.  
 
3.2.2. Croatia 
 
At the time of independence Croatia was a relatively ethnically heterogeneous polity. 
A new constitution was adopted soon after the HDZ’s (Croatian Democratic Union) 
victory and transformed the bi-national state into a Croat nation-state, with explicitly 
ethnic membership criteria. Serbs lost their status as a constituent narod, which was 
‘downgraded’ to that of a national minority. Initially supported by Milošević, ethnic 
Serb nationalist leaders in Croatia declared a Serb autonomous region (Krajina), de 
facto seceding from the independent Croatia. Not least because of this case, demands 
for autonomy became increasingly associated with separatism. 
                                                 
 
24 Article 3, Ustava Republike Slovenije [Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia], 28 December 1991. 
25 Tomaž Deželan, “Citizenship in Slovenia: the regime of a nationalising or a Europeanising state?”,  
CITSEE working paper 2011/16. 
26 The IDZ-DDI party in Slovenian Istria attempted to mirror its successful regionalist counterpart in 
the Croatian Istria, but it found little political support. 
27 Drago Perko: “Regionalizacija Slovenije”, Geografski zbornik, no. 38, 1998, pp. 12-57 
28  Ivo Piry, “Regionalizacija Slovenije - nedokončana simfonija slovenske geografije” in Dela no. 24     
(2005) pp. 37-48. 
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In the midst of the war, in 1992 Croatia was divided (and remains so) into 20 
(de jure) symmetrically organised counties (županije) and the city of Zagreb.29 Each of 
these has a directly elected government. Since 2009, heads of counties (župani) are also 
directly elected. Counties nevertheless have very limited autonomy. At first sight, the 
establishment of counties under the rule of Franjo Tuđman is surprising considering 
that idioms of nationhood were based on the conception of a unitary and homogenous 
nation. But the gerrymandering of the territory into counties without historic, 
institutional precedents, all of them with ethnic Croat majorities, was an attempt to 
offset Krajina Serb secessionist drives and also regionalisms in the historic provinces 
of Istria and Dalmatia. Under the Habsburgs, the crown lands of Croatia, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia and the March of Istria had distinct historic institutional existences, which 
were not necessarily based on ethnicity. Thus, endowing these regions with even 
minimal powers was vehemently opposed by the centralising ethnic nationalists. It 
was feared that decentralisation based on historic regions would “have [had] negative 
effects on the still unfinished process of national integration”.30 No less importantly, 
the system of territorial division into counties was conceived also as one of the 
safeguards to HDZ’s dominance in the parliament due to the existence of the upper 
chamber, the House of Counties. That the Tuđman government was not genuinely 
promoting decentralisation could be seen in the earlier decision to abolish all the 
associations of municipalities through constitutional amendments.31 Apart from the 
apparent desire to centralise the state and pre-empt the possible creation of a 
regionally based opposition, Tuđman feared armed resistance to his rule (not 
unfoundedly as will be shown later) which could be upheld by a particular reading of 
the constitution on the competences of the associations in the areas of defence and 
public security.32 In the post-Tuđman era, the territorial structure remained unaltered 
while the House of Counties was abolished. The only measures towards (limited) 
decentralisation in that period took place in the Istrian County. 
 
3.2.3. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), that formally ended the war in BiH, defined 
the blueprint of the post-war state and sanctioned the territorial reconfigurations and 
ethnic cleansing caused by the war. The ethno-national division was mirrored by the 
state’s territorial division into two entities, the Bosniak-and-Croat-dominated 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Serb-dominated Republika 
                                                 
 
29 See Map 1. 
30 Josip Vrbošić, “Povijesni pregled razvitka županijske uprave i samouprave u Hrvatskoj”, Društvena  
istraživanja (No. 1, 1992), p.66. 
31 Odluka o proglašenju Ustavnog zakona za provođenje Amandmana LXIV. do LXXIV. na Ustav Socijalističke 
Republike Hrvatske (Zagreb: 25 July 1990). 
32 Article 184, Ustav Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske [Constitution of the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia], 1974. 
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Srpska (RS)33. On the other hand, the DPA upheld the external borders of BiH, which 
had been relatively stable for over three centuries, albeit as internal borders of the 
Ottoman and Habsburg empires and of the Yugoslav federation.  
The state of BiH was defined as belonging to the three main ethnic groups and 
a number of political rights currently stem from the membership in one of the three 
‘constituent peoples’, rather than from civic or territorial membership in the state-
wide polity. The Dayton Constitution entrenched an (extreme) form of ethnic division 
within BiH politics. Even legal citizenship is divided between the two entities and the 
central state. Which of those levels have primacy over the other is uncertain as is the 
designation of BiH as either federal or confederal state.34 Sociologically and 
historically, prominent territorial identities, in regions such as Herzegovina, for 
example, are as a rule overshadowed by ethnic politics in BiH. The loci of ethnic 
nation-building in post-Dayton BiH were mainly rescaled to sub-state territorial units 
with clear ethnic majorities, in other words the two entities, ten cantons and, in the 
cases of the two ethnically mixed cantons, to constituent municipalities where ethnic 
majorities are established. One of the few exceptions to the ethno-majoritarian 
territorial divisions is the Brčko District, formally a condominium of the two entities 
that nevertheless functions entirely autonomously from either of those.  
 
3.2.4. Macedonia 
 
Despite being ethnically heterogeneous (over one third of the population have 
declared non-Macedonian ethnicity since 1991), the newly independent Macedonia 
was constituted as a nation-state of the Macedonian narod35 with only a few rights 
(such as language use) formally reserved for municipalities with significant numbers 
of members of ethnic minorities. In line with the unitary logic of nationhood and 
statehood, there was a strong tendency towards the centralisation of the state.36 The 
competences of local authorities were further decreased in the second half of the 
1990s. No meso-level governance, elected or appointed was ever established in 
Macedonia.  
The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), a peace settlement signed in 2001 
with international involvement, ended hostilities between armed ethnic Albanian 
insurgents37 and the government. The OFA proposed the establishment of a 
                                                 
 
33 See Map 3. 
34 Igor Štiks '“Being a Citizen the Bosnian Way”, in Transformations of Citizenship and Political Identities 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina Transitions (2011) Vol. 51, No 1-2, p.257. 
35 Preamble, Ustav na Republika Makedonija [Constitutution of the Republic of Macedonia], Skopje, 17  
November 1991. 
36 Ilija Todorovski, “Local Government in the Macedonia”, in Emilija Kandeva (ed.), Stabilization of 
local governments (Budapest: OSI/LGI, 2001), pp. 241-288. 
37 The demands of the insurgents were not for outright secession but for an autonomy and equal 
political representation. Some ethnic Macedonian politicians at the time, including the PM, flirted 
with the idea of partitioning the country along ethnic lines in order to create an ethnically 
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consociational form of government with ethnic veto points (though these were less 
explicit than in BiH). Although it envisioned the change of constitutional preamble, 
which would, from then on, refer only to the Macedonian citizens with a clear civic 
logic, the adopted amendments to the constitution in fact mention the Macedonian 
nation first, as well as the “citizens who live inside its [Macedonia’s] borders who 
are a part of Albanian”38 and parts of other (enumerated) nations. This testifies to the 
prevalence of (mono)ethnic logic of nationhood in Macedonia and the idea that the 
state ‘belongs’ to the majority ethnic group. Directly connected to this is the 
perception of territorial autonomy as the slippery slope to secession visible in 
founding documents. This potent and commonly (mis)used argument permeated the 
OFA which states that “[t]here are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues”.39 
 
3.2.5. Montenegro 
 
Unlike other former Yugoslav republics, Montenegro did not seek independence in 
the 1990s and constituted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia together with Serbia. 
Following the split within the ruling Montenegrin party in the late 1990s and the 
party majority’s decision to distance themselves from Slobodan Milošević and his 
policies, Montenegro gradually acquired the prerogatives of an independent state.40 
It held a referendum in 2006 and the results favoured independence and ended the 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Just as its predecessors, the independent 
Republic of Montenegro is organised as a unitary state. The only elected 
administrative subdivisions of the state are local municipalities.  
The criteria of membership as espoused by the formal documents and 
proclaimed by the ruling elites are civic. This, however, is questionable as the 
government and the opposition do engage in conscious ethnic engineering. Ethnic 
identities expressed in censuses often serve as proxies for support for political 
parties in Montenegro and the two conflicting visions of the polity’s future. This 
cleavage was and still is deliberately politicised by the two main camps, ‘pro-
Montenegrin’ and ‘pro-Serb’.41 However, there is no express demand for regional 
autonomy but rather for the recognition of (28.73% self-declared) Serbs as the 
constitutive nation alongside (44.98% self-declared) Montenegrins. In the 1990s, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
homogenous Macedonian rump state. See Eben Friedman, “The Spectre of Territorial Division and 
the Ohrid Agreement” ECMI Brief, no. 9 (Flensburg: ECMI, 2003). 
38 Amendment IV to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia [Amandman IV na Ustavot na 
Republika Makedonija] 07-3795/1, 16 November 2001. (my italics) 
39 Article 1.2., Framework Agreement, Ohrid, 13 August 2001. 
40 Jelena Džankić uses the term 'creeping independence' based on Elizabeth Roberts's work (2002 &  
2007) to account for the gradual process of the (re)establishment of Montenegro's statehood. See 
Jelena Džankić, Report on Montenegro, EUDO, 2010. 
41 On the distinction between ‘pro-Montenegrin’ and ‘pro-Serb’ parties see Jelena Džankić, 
“Transformations of Citizenship in Montenegro: a context-generated evolution of citizenship policies”  
CITSEE Working Paper 2010/03, p. 11. 
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there was a regional movement in the Montenegrin part of the Sandžak region, led 
by Bosniak/Muslim minority politicians that sought self-government together with 
the remainder of Sandžak in Serbia. Its focus shifted towards achieving more 
cultural rights for the Bosniaks/Muslims as Montenegro’s dissociation from Serbia 
progressed.  
 
3.2.6. Serbia 
 
Serbia (re)gained its independence as a result of Montenegro’s departure from the 
state union. The particular territorial structure of the state is largely the legacy of 
Milošević’s rule and its overt centralisation in the 1990s. In that period the state 
polity was formally defined as civic, but a huge discord existed between the official 
founding documents and the actual ethno-nationalist policies on the ground.42 The 
trope of ‘civic-ness’ coupled with the purported danger of secessionism was used to 
legitimate unprecedented centralisation measures. Not only were the Autonomous 
Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo significantly limited or dismantled, but regional 
associations within Serbia were abolished too. The underlying aim was to limit any 
possible opposition to the regime, be it territorial, ethnic or any other kind. In a 
move that further augmented centralisation, in 1995 all the previously socially-
owned property that had been used by the municipalities/autonomous provinces 
became the property of the central state, thus curtailing the already limited 
capacities of municipalities/autonomous provinces.  
Following the change of the regime in 2000, certain moves towards 
decentralisation of the state took place while the formal political membership 
definitions were changed to correspond closely to the ethnic policies applied in 
practice. The 2006 constitution reflected that reality and defined Serbia as a nation-
state of the Serb narod while enumerating traditional ethnic groups. Nationhood was 
conceived primarily in ethnic terms; Serbia’s role as a kin-state of all ethnic Serbs 
was confirmed in the constitution. This makes Serbia probably the only obvious case 
in which the espoused membership criteria were significantly altered in favour of 
ethnic membership in the post-2000 period.  
According to the 2006 constitution, Serbia is organised as a unitary state, 
nevertheless with two asymmetric autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Metohija, 
and Vojvodina. However, since 1999, Serbia has no control over Kosovo, which 
declared independence unilaterally in 2008. Apart from Vojvodina and its elected 
meso-level government, other units of territorial government in Serbia are 
municipalities (and cities). In theory, the 2006 constitution allows for the creation of 
other autonomous provinces but under difficult conditions. As I will subsequently 
argue, there is a degree of tension between the conception of nationhood as unitary 
                                                 
 
42 Jelena Vasiljević, “Citizenship and belonging in Serbia: in the crossfire of changing national 
narratives”, CITSEE Working Paper Series 2011/17, p. 11.  
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and ethnically defined and the existence of the asymmetric, multi-ethnic 
autonomous region of Vojvodina43 in the otherwise highly centralised state of Serbia.  
 
3.2.7. Kosovo 
 
Compared to the other countries emerging from the dissolution of the Yugoslav 
federation, Kosovo is relatively ethnically homogenous. However, the constitutive 
documents refer also to communities other than the majority ethnic Albanians. This 
occurrence could be attributed to the international community’s involvement in the 
establishment of Kosovo’s institutions through the process of ‘supervised 
independence’. The state is defined as multi-ethnic and civic (with corresponding 
symbols used) while, at the same time, exhibiting a degree of communitarian 
unevenness imbedded in the founding documents as well as practices. For example, 
Albanian and Serbian are official languages in the entire country, whereas the 
languages of the other constitutionally recognised communities – Turks, Bosniaks, 
and Roma – are official only in the municipalities in which those communities reach 
over 5% of population44. The unevenness is further illustrated by the constitutional 
definition of Kosovo as a “multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other 
Communities”45 but also by the existence of autonomy for ethnic Serb municipalities46 
which at the same time enjoy strong institutional links with Serbia.47 The Serb 
autonomies function in most of Kosovo, save the north where the ethnic Serb majority 
defies the Kosovo government.  
 
4. Citizenship at the Sub-state Level: Territories and Political Membership in Post-
Yugoslav States 
 
This section identifies four general categories of sub-state polities with some 
overlapping features within and across categories. To put it differently, the cases 
exhibit a degree of family resemblance on a continuum. It starts with the historic 
autonomist multi-ethnic polities at the one end of this continuum finishing with the 
recent secessionist ethnically exclusive polities at the other end. Membership and 
identities in those polities are conceptualised (in most cases) differently from the 
                                                 
 
43 See Map 2. 
44 The only exception is the official status of the Turkish language in the municipality of Prizren which  
does not depend on the numerical strength of an ethno-linguistic community. See Article 2, Law No.  
02/L-37 On the use [of] languages, 2006.  
45 Article 3, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008. 
46 See Map 5. 
47 The municipality of Mamusha/Mamuşa with an ethnic Turkish majority has a degree of de facto 
local autonomy (especially in terms of education) but does not have explicit formal institutional links 
with Turkey. More data on Mamusha/Mamuşa municipality can be found at 
http://www.ecmimap.com/map/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=72
&Itemid=104&lang=en  
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overarching (nesting) state-level polity membership. The conceptions of membership 
in sub-state polities elucidate the territorial differentiation in the state political 
community classically bounded by single citizenship regime, even in the case where 
there is no distinct formal citizenship at the sub-state level.  
 
4.1. Non-secessionist multi-ethnic regions 
  
The processes of (re)constructing territorial polities and defining their political 
membership in the post-1990 Yugoslav context did not always rely on exclusive 
ethnicity, nor did they necessarily cause violent conflicts within the polity, quite the 
contrary. Some of the cases of sub-state regional polities illustrate that point. The most 
obvious examples are Vojvodina in Serbia and Istria in Croatia.48 The abortive project 
of Dalmatian regionalism in Croatia, and Sandžak regionalism in Serbia, shared some 
similarities with the former cases. Especially in the first three cases, there were grass-
root political movements (less or more successful) that strove for the preservation of 
the multi-ethnic nature of these historic territories and evoked territory-centred 
criteria of membership as well as demands for territorial self-government. In all four 
cases secession as an option was excluded.  
 Dalmatian regionalists in the 1990s attempted to (re)establish a multi-ethnic 
territorial polity in the borders of the historic crown land that largely corresponded to 
the territory of the Association of Municipalities of Dalmatia which existed from 1974 
until 1990, when it was abolished by the Tuđman government. The movement was 
unsuccessful, mainly due to the already advanced ethno-nationalist polarisation and 
repression against the Dalmatian Action, the chief regionalist party (including 
bombings and show trials49). Currently, Dalmatia is divided into four counties and 
there are no significant grass-root political movements for the (re)establishment of the 
Dalmatian regional polity, excluding occasional proposals by certain state-wide 
parties, usually in the election campaign.  
 In the case of Sandžak, there were (and still exist) political actors who 
advocated the  autonomy of this historic region in Serbia.50 Their demands are for an 
ethnic autonomy of regional majority Bosniaks.51 In the late 1990s and 2000s there 
were some attempts within one of the Sandžak-based parties (Sandžak Democratic 
Party - SDP) to capture the votes of Sandžak Serbs and to present itself as a multi-
ethnic regional party. But due to obstacles such as the electoral system disfavouring 
smaller region-based parties and visible interethnic polarisation, the SDP reverted to 
                                                 
 
48 See Dejan Stjepanović, “Regions and Territorial Autonomy in Southeastern Europe”, in Alain-G  
Gagnon, Michael Keating (eds.) Political Autonomy and Divided Societies: Imagining Democratic 
Alternatives in Complex Settings (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
49 “Ljudi koje je 90-ih trebalo ukloniti”, Nacional no. 741, 26 January 2010. 
50 See Map 2. 
51  See Kenneth Morrison,”Political and Religious Conflict in the Sandžak” Balkan Series 13/08 
(Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2008). 
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representing the interests of Sandžak Bosniaks. The demands for territorial autonomy 
were toned down and direct access to the central state became a preferred strategy. 
Currently there is no sub-state polity that covers the territorial extent of this historic 
region. Regional identification is divided amongst the main ethnic groups; Bosniaks 
predominantly refer to the region as Sandžak, while most Serbs prefer the mediaeval 
designation Raška.  
 Regionalists in Vojvodina and Istria, unlike those in Dalmatia and Sandžak, 
were more successful in (re)establishing regional polities on multi-ethnic principles. 
The Autonomous Province of Vojvodina was a case in point of Yugoslav uniqueness, 
especially because the autonomous settlement was established in a multi-ethnic 
historic territory where Serbs constituted a plurality/majority52. In the last 25 years, 
Vojvodina’s autonomous powers have witnessed significant fluctuations. Formally a 
decentralised autonomous province in the socialist Serbia and a de facto federal unit of 
Yugoslavia, Vojvodina’s autonomy was almost entirely annulled during the 
authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s. Following regime change in 
2000, this province has gradually regained more autonomous powers but not to the 
degree enjoyed under communism, when the rights enjoyed by residents of Vojvodina 
(although formally citizens of the Socialist Republic of Serbia) matched those of the 
republics of the Yugoslav federation. 
 Continued public support for further decentralisation across ethnic groups53 
indicates that autonomy is a deeply entrenched element of democratic citizenship in 
Vojvodina. A number of political parties, both regionally based as well as state-wide, 
have responded to this actuality and promoted broadening of Vojvodina’s autonomy 
especially in the post-2000 period. Asymmetric autonomy within Serbia is the most 
frequently evoked political claim.54 Secession was never a significant option, neither in 
public opinion polls nor in political party agendas. Thus, various forms of partial exit 
dominate over total exit. After the change of regime in October 2000, the so-called 
‘Omnibus’ law55 was adopted as a stop-gap measure until the 2006 Serbian 
constitution formally enabled the transfer of powers to Vojvodina’s regional 
institutions. 
                                                 
 
52 Hungarians are the second largest ethnic community, historically and currently, forming over 14% 
of Vojvodina’s population in the 2002 census. Serbs are a historic majority although they became an 
absolute majority after WWII when a large proportion of ethnic Germans was expelled or left the 
country. Other, numerically significant autochthonous groups include Slovaks, Croats, Romanians, 
Ruthenians, and Roma.  
53 Scientia, Novi Sad, 1995; GEOTAKT project, Novi Sad, 2001; Dragomir Jankov, Vojvodina, Propadanje 
jednog regiona: podaci i činjenice (Novi Sad: Graphica Academica, 2004); Scan, Novi Sad, 2010. 
54 The League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), a prominent regionally-based regionalist party, 
in 1999, on the eve of the Kosovo war, advocated restructuring Serbia as a federal state in which 
Vojvodina (and Kosovo) would be a federal republic with its own legal citizenship. This position was 
abandoned soon after. See LSV, Vojvodina Republika: Put mira, razvoja i stabilnosti, (Novi Sad, 1999). 
55 Zakon o utvrđivanju određenih nadležnosti autonomne pokrajine, (Službeni list RS, 6/2002). 
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 The constitution offered more substance to Vojvodina’s government according 
to which it should have extensive executive, limited legislative and very few judicial 
powers, further defined in the 2008 Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, 
the region’s founding document. However, the ratification of the statute in the state 
parliament in 2009 was not smooth and was challenged by nationalists/centralists. 
Apart from enumerating autonomous powers, the adopted statute also refers to the 
criteria of membership in the polity. While it makes references to the equality of all 
ethnic communities (no majority-minority language is used) and the use of the six 
official languages, it also defines Vojvodina as a region of its citizens/denizens. The 
actual term used is the Serbo-Croat građani/građanke (in masculine and feminine form) 
which has added residential and civic notions56 to that of državljani/državljanke which 
is primarily about the legal status of a citizen. References to građani/građanke as the 
members of the polity is also different from the references to membership in the 
Serbian constitution, which considers first of all Serb people, in the ethno-national 
sense, as the bearers of sovereignty. The ethically constitutive stories, unlike in the 
definition of Serbian polity, centred mainly on Vojvodina’s multi-ethnic character but 
also on its institutional history distinct from Serbia Proper. 
 The politics of regionalism in the Croatian region of Istria resemble those in 
Vojvodina to a large extent. The historic Habsburg Istrian March excluding the 
municipality of Muggia (that remained in Italy) was formally incorporated into 
Yugoslavia in 1954. Out of this territory, the largest part was included in the Socialist 
Republic of Croatia. Despite the process of ethnic homogenisation, minority rights 
were guaranteed by international and bilateral agreements, while the Italian language 
was officially used in the municipalities with significant ethnic Italian minorities. At 
the same time Istria was not constituted as a distinguishable sub-republican territory 
in Yugoslav times.  
 While Croatia descended into ethnic war in the 1990s, Istrian regionalist 
politicians chose another path and a different legitimising narrative, that of European 
regionalism. This narrative was chiefly promoted by the Istrian Democratic Assembly 
(IDS-DDI) party. The party’s platform was based on the protection of Istria’s economic 
interests, as well as the civic, territorial, multicultural and plurinational character of 
the Istrian polity. A political interpretation of history and the use of historiography 
idealising Istria’s tolerant past and the principle of convivenza (living together) became 
important features of the regionalist project. The party has won all county and state 
elections in Istria since 1992. After the change of Tuđman’s regime in 2000, the IDS 
                                                 
 
56 The difference between građani and državljani is not clearly defined in the legislation of countries  
where it is used. Only in the case of Montenegro, does the 2005 law on residency registry make an  
explicit distinction between a građanin, a citizen of Montenegro (or Serbia as at that time the state 
union of Serbia and Montenegro) residing in Montengro. The term državljanin would then by analogy 
relate only to legal citizens of Montenegro, irrespective of their residency. On the case of Montenegro 
see Džankić (2010), p.13, on the disambiguation between the terms http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/citizenship-glossary/terminology  
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supported the then Social Democrats-led government and managed to push through 
the Statute of the Istrian County. The Statute contains safeguards for Istria’s cultural 
and linguistic specificities and enabled the institutionalisation of bilingualism in the 
entire county. In this way a quasi-autonomous status for the county was secured 
based on which Istrian County residents enjoy differentiated rights from those in the 
rest of Croatia, especially when it comes to language and education.  
 Just as in the case of Vojvodina, the Statute of the Istrian County defines 
membership by references to građani/građanke rather than the region’s majority 
Croats.57 The fact that the statute defined Istria as the territorial unit of its 
građani/građanke was one of the formal reasons given by the Constitutional Court of 
Croatia for striking down the statute in 1995.58 Paradoxically, at first sight, the almost 
unchanged statute was approved in 2002 under a different government. Very similar 
issues have prompted the nationalist parties in Serbia to submit the statute of 
Vojvodina and the Law on Establishing Jurisdiction of Vojvodina to review by the 
Constitutional Court of Serbia. Most recently, on 10 July 2012, the Constitutional 
Court has disputed around 20 regulations of the law, a move that problematizes the 
substance of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of Vojvodina. 
 Based on the (cursory) references to the cases of multi-ethnic sub-state polities 
one can observe that under the ethnocratic/authoritarian regimes of the 1990s, the 
attempt to institutionalise sub-state polities on multi-ethnic and civic principles was 
strongly opposed by centralising nationalists. In the 2000s, the establishment and 
broadening of powers of those sub-state polities where there was a strong political 
demand for self-government but also where the state-wide ethnic majority was also a 
regional majority (as is the case in Vojvodina and Istria) were tolerated. What is 
interesting about both cases is the fact that some of the differentiated rights enjoyed 
by the citizens/residents of these regional polities do not depend on numerical 
strength of a particular ethnic or linguistic group (as they do in most other cases of 
sub-state polities).     
 
4.2. ‘Imposed’ multi-ethnic polities 
 
Apart from the multi-ethnic polities resulting from bottom-up political demands, 
there are a few polities in the former Yugoslav space, which are defined by reference 
to two or more ethnic groups, existing at the sub-sub state level. Unlike the former, 
these were created in the aftermath of peace settlements and were imposed from 
above either as a negotiated agreement of two states and international sponsorship or 
by international arbitration. Unlike the previous cases of historic multi-ethnic regions, 
these polities have none or very weak and recent territorial precedents. Both of these 
                                                 
 
57 Article 5 of the Statute of the Istrian County defines the county as the “unit of regional self-
government of its citizens”. 
58 Odluka za ocjenu suglasnosti Statuta Županije Istarske sa Ustavom RH, 2 February 1995. 
http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1995_02_9_146.html  
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cases come from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). They are primarily the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Brčko District of BiH.  
 The aims and logic behind the establishment of these polities were not 
secession but rather (re-) integration into the state of BiH. The FBiH was created in 
1994 when the US government sponsored an agreement between the central BiH 
government (dominated by Bosniaks) and the government of the Republic of Croatia 
that had been until then supporting the demands of BiH Croats for secession from 
BiH. Following the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), the FBiH was recognised as one of 
the constitutive ‘entities’ (thus avoiding calling them federal or confederal units) 
alongside Republika Srpska (RS).  
 In the initial years of its existence, the FBiH was defined as a “territory with 
majority Bosniak and Croat population”59 in BiH. Consequently, Bosniaks and Croats 
were considered as the bearers of the right to self-determination that would be 
exercised in the federal entity consisting of ten cantons. Serbs were not only 
symbolically excluded from the founding documents but also from actual governance 
until 2000 when the Constitutional Court of BiH ruled that all three ethnic groups 
(based on the BiH Constitution) are to be equal and ‘constitutive’ in the entire BiH 
(both in the FBiH and RS)60. Non-ethnics or members of smaller minorities still face 
hurdles in exercising their full political rights. 
  In reality, despite elaborate prescription of ethnic power-sharing at the FBiH 
level, most powers are exercised by cantons which, apart from the two special status 
mixed Bosniak-Croat cantons (where powers are further devolved to municipalities), 
had clear ethnic majorities at the time when they were established. The logic was to 
descale and decentralise powers so as to reach the territorial level at which a strong 
ethnic majority would be exhibited. In this sense territories were simply used as 
proxies for ethnicity and ethnic representation rather than as an expression of genuine 
democratic demands and cross-cutting interests with spatial boundaries. Most of the 
cantons (i.e. subunits of the FBiH) are also currently formally defined as multi-ethnic 
and bear some resemblance to the polity of the FBiH. 
 The case of Brčko District had a somewhat different establishment trajectory 
from the FBiH. During the 1995 Dayton peace talks which ended the war, the parties 
could not reach an agreement on whether the strategically located city belonged to RS 
or the FBiH. The issue was resolved by international arbitration a few years after the 
end of hostilities. The arbitration tribunal decided that the city of Brčko and its 
surroundings, matching the pre-war Brčko municipal boundaries, would formally 
belong to both entities simultaneously, thus creating a sort of quasi-condominium. 
With the benefits of hindsight of how heavily prescribed power-sharing in FBiH and 
at the state level caused frequent deadlocks, the international supervisors of the 
District restrained from institutionalising formal ethnic power-sharing. Instead, 
                                                 
 
59 Article 1, Ustav Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine [Constitution of FBiH], 1994.  
60 Djelimična odluka Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine, 30 June and 1 July 2000 
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ancillary instruments were introduced, such as the three fifths of the District assembly 
majority necessary for the election of the District mayor (head of the District 
government). Such measures necessitate cooperation between ethnic elites,61 assure 
representation of major ethnic groups but also the inclusion of political representation 
and engagement of non-dominant ethnicities. Formally, there is no reference to 
membership as ethnically defined but only to the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian 
languages being official in the District. The statute allows for all citizens of BiH to 
hold public office without discrimination based on their ethnicity. As to differentiated 
rights, apart from having its own, unique for BiH, ethnically integrated educational 
system, all other competences of the District are equal to those of the entities. Until 
2005 when obligatory military conscription was abolished in BiH,  BiH citizens, 
residents of the Brčko District were not required to serve in the army. 
  However, as there is no formal Brčko level citizenship (Brčko residents can 
choose either of the entity citizenships) some of the political rights including voting 
rights are still tied to formal entity citizenship. Thus, Brčko residents who did not 
chose an entity citizenship62 cannot vote in the state-wide election63. In order to 
exercise that right they have to identify with one of the two entities (RS or FBiH) 
either by formally taking one of the entity citizenships or requesting to be enrolled in 
the electoral rolls of the entities.  
 Unlike in Brčko, formal membership definitions in FBiH correspond to those at 
the state level and refer to Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others. Internally, though, 
Brčko is closer to a genuinely multi-ethnic polity than the ethnically ghettoised FBiH 
is. However, in both cases there are problems with substantial (non-ethnic) political 
representation in vertically higher polities. In some respects both of the cases exhibit 
elements of democratic deficiency, to which the case of Brčko's citizens inability to 
directly influence decision-making processes at the state level testifies. Non-entity 
citizens in Brčko or non-ethnically identified citizens in FBiH have restricted 
opportunities for making claims on the institutions of the nesting polities, thus 
undermining principles of democratic citizenship. 
 
4.3. Post-conflict ethnic municipalities 
 
In the immediate post-conflict setting, and in all the cases as part of comprehensive 
peace agreements in Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia, particular types of ethnic micro-
level territorial polities were created in order to accommodate ethnonationalist 
demands. In all of these cases, there were weak, if any, historical territorial precedents 
of polities and the spatial boundaries were created (or upheld) to serve the purposes 
                                                 
 
61 Statut Brčko Distrikta Bosne i Hercegovine, 2010.  
62 According to some accounts there are over 30,000 Brčko residents without entity citizenship. See  
Centralna izborna komisija BiH, http://www.izbori.ba/default.asp?col=Saopstenja&Datum=2010-07-02 
63 See “Bosnia's third citizens: a story of Brčko's exception”, CITSEE 2012. 
http://www.citsee.eu/citsee-story/bosnia’s-third-citizens-story-brčko’s-exception 
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of ethnic demographic representation (either as a majority or a minority over a 
legally-defined threshold).  
 The first two cases are the municipalities created through the post-conflict 
decentralisation processes as basic units of local self-government with limited option 
for their mutual association or the creation of meso-level bodies. These are the cases of 
Macedonia’s municipalities with significant ethnic Albanian population and Kosovo 
Serb municipalities (south of the River Ibar). In both cases they are embedded in 
unitary state structures and the ethnic self-government is complementary to the 
power-sharing mechanisms at the central level (more limited in the case of Kosovo). 
 The peace agreement that ended the interethnic conflict in Macedonia in 2001  
clearly favoured the municipal framework for addressing the demands of ethnic 
Albanians. It was feared that creating a meso-level polity with several majority 
Albanian municipalities64 might be used for potential future secessionist claims65. 
Hence, the OFA’s reference to no territorial solutions to ethnic conflicts, mentioned 
earlier. However, very specific rights are devolved to municipalities, so that the more 
than 20% of the population who are non-ethnic Macedonians can use their language 
and display the community flag among other enumerated rights, short of territorial 
autonomy (as municipalities cannot adopt their own legislation). Despite the fact that 
OFA refers to the possibility of inter-municipal cooperation, the adopted legislation 
has strong safeguards against anything that might resemble territorially-defined 
meso-level polity66. 
 The decentralisation of powers to municipalities and the strict definition of 
demographic criteria have a number of consequences for substantial citizenship and 
political rights. First of all, decentralisation is considered as a zero-sum game of ethnic 
control over municipalities.67 Any changes of municipal boundaries that might be 
driven by functional concerns cause suspicion of possible status reversal.68 Despite the 
fact that these municipalities can form committees on inter-community relations, 
smaller minorities (under 20%), most often Turks or Roma, are largely excluded from 
decision making. Also, as the status of minorities depends solely on their 
                                                 
 
64 See Map 4. 
65 This potentiality would not be unprecedented, as in 1993 ethnic Albanian political leaders declared 
the ‘Republic of Ilirida’ in the west of the Republic of Macedonia predominantly inhabited by ethnic 
Albanians. See Kevin Adamson and Dejan Jović, “The Macedonian-Albanian political frontier: the 
rearticulation of post-Yugoslav political identities”, Nations and Nationalism 10(3), 2004, p. 296. 
66 Articles 14 of the Law on Local Self-government [Zakon za lokalnata samouprava], (Sl. vesnik na RM,  
29 January 2002) says municipalities can cooperate and form common services but Article 81 of the  
same law requires 2/3 of all the municipalities in Macedonia to join the association. This effectively  
prevents the formation of an association of Albanian dominated municipalities. 
67 ICG Report, Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, 2003, p. 20. 
68 The most recent example is the opposition of the majority ethnic Macedonian village municipality 
of Drugovo to being absorbed by the larger town municipality of Kichevo that has an ethnic Albanian 
population of over 20%. See “Makedonsko Drugovo nekje vo Albansko Kichevo”, Dnevnik 18 March  
2012, http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=3F525DB462E9554794814C3B8D536396  
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demography, censuses are politically sensitive and often misused as the boycotting 
and subsequent failure of the 2011 Macedonian census shows.  
 The case of Kosovo Serb municipalities is sometimes described as ethnic 
enclavisation or the constitution of “de facto sovereign territorialities that correspond 
to ethnopolitical movements”.69 Thus, ethnic boundaries of these municipal polities 
were often imposed over a particular physical space. This is especially visible in the 
case of Gračanica/Graçanicë municipality whose borders70 were carved out of three 
pre-war municipalities in 2008 so as to form a single majority ethnic Serb 
municipality.71 Some other municipalities, such as Štrpce/Shtërpcë had a Serb majority 
earlier, so its pre-1999 borders remained intact. The Ahtisaari plan as a comprehensive 
blueprint for the functioning of independent Kosovo government envisaged 
substantial municipal ethnic Serb autonomy with its own legislation and strong links 
with Serbia, especially when it comes to education and health care. They possess 
significantly more powers than the Macedonian municipalities mentioned above and 
include, for example, choosing the chief of the local police station. For a long while 
these municipalities were integrated into both Kosovan and Serbian system of self-
government simultaneously, leading to paradoxes of having two elected municipal 
bodies exercising powers over the same territory. These Serb municipalities served in 
all matters as de facto exclaves of Serbia. Serbian institutions have been gradually 
losing ground to Kosovan in the last few years, not only because of that fact that 
Serbia Proper has no contiguous boundary with these municipalities and that they 
function within Kosovan economic space. Despite the relatively successful integration 
of ethnic Serb municipalities into the Kosovo system of governance it remains to be 
seen what type of issues regarding substantial citizenship will emerge in ethnically-
segregated political spaces which exhibit elements of illiberalism and ghettoisation.  
 In 1998, parts of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia (commonly 
referred to as Eastern Slavonia72 and held by rebel Croatian Serb forces during the 
1990s war) were peacefully (re)integrated into Croatia’s political system based on the 
Erdut agreement73. No formal regional autonomy was envisaged by the agreement 
save the establishment of a joint council of municipalities.74 The purposes of the 
council were to coordinate cultural autonomy, primarily language and script use, 
education, cultural activities75 (municipalities with at least one-third of Serbs enjoy 
                                                 
 
69 Carl T. Dahlman and Trent Williams, “Ethnic Enclavisation and State Formation in Kosovo,” 
Geopolitics, Volume 15, Issue 2, (2010), p.414. 
70 See Map 6. 
71 ECMI, The Ethnopolitical map of Kosovo, Gračanica/Graçanicë. http://www.ecmi-
map.com/map/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=70&Itemid=105&lan
g=en (last accessed 29 June 2012) 
72 See Map 7. 
73 Tekst temeljnog sporazuma o Istočnoj Slavoniji, Baranji i Zapadnom Srijemu (Erdutski sporazum), 
12 November 1995. http://www.snv.hr/pdf/erdutski_sporazum.pdf 
74 Article 12, ibid. 
75 Statut Zajedničkog vijeća općina, Vukovar, 2001. 
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these based on the constitutional law on the rights of national minorities76) as well as 
the proportional representation of Serbs in public offices in Eastern Slavonia. In 2010, 
a constitutional law on national minorities that was supposed to give legal clout to the 
joint council was rejected under charges that this would imply territorial 
reconfiguration of the state; while for many it bore resemblances to self-proclaimed 
Serb ethnic autonomy in Krajina and seemed a possible threat to the state’s territorial 
integrity77.  
 Thus, just as in the case of ethnic Albanian municipalities in Macedonia, this 
case shows that establishing coordinating or joint municipal bodies with regional 
ethnic majorities raises concerns, which can lead to these initiatives being blackballed, 
despite the fact that their establishment was envisaged by the respective peace 
settlement documents. Membership in all of these municipal polities, as well as 
citizen’s rights in them, are primarily based on ethnic affiliation and demography, 
which puts into question their sustainability and in many ways promotes ethnic 
entrepreneurs as arbiters between the state and these municipal polities.  
 
4.4. Separatist sub-state polities 
 
This group of cases would refer to sub-state polities that were formed with the aim of 
separating from the newly independent post-Yugoslav states, forming an independent 
state or seceding to its ethnic kin-state. Two subsets can be further distinguished, 
those with historic precedents and recent territories. Kosovo in the 1990s and, to a 
lesser extent, the self-proclaimed Krajina region in Croatia would belong to the first 
group.78 Recent cases include Republika Srpska, Herzeg-Bosnia in BiH, and in many 
ways, North Kosovo. 
 Kosovo was a historic territory that possessed its own territorial personality 
under the Ottoman Empire and in socialist times. Two simultaneous processes, the 
demands of ethnic Albanian elites in Kosovo for equal representation and centralist 
Serbian nationalists’ decision to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy nudged Kosovo 
Albanians towards seeking full independence. This was largely to be achieved by 
peaceful means and by the establishment of the new ‘parallel system’. It consisted of a 
separate Albanian language-only education system as well as a network of health 
centres that functioned independently from the Serbian state.79 In other words, the 
large majority of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo throughout 1990s used non-territorial 
exit options, i.e. not consuming the public goods of the Serbian polity, being excluded 
from that polity and self-excluding at the same time. The membership in the ‘parallel’ 
polity was based almost entirely on ethnic principles. Following the armed rebellion 
                                                 
 
76 Article 12, Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina, N/N 01-081-02-3955/2, 19 December 2002. 
77 “Ne srpskoj autonomiji”, Jutarnji list 17 June 2010. 
78 The case of Krajina could potentially fit either of the categories.  
79 Gezim Krasniqi, ”The challenge of building an independent citizenship regime in a partially 
recognised state: the case of Kosovo”, CITSEE Working Paper Series, 2010/04, p.9. 
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and Milošević's attempts at ethnic cleansing in 1999 that prompted international 
military involvement, the situation was reversed and the Kosovo Albanian majority 
(with the support of the US and the majority of the EU members) was able to exercise 
a total territorial exit option. 
 Unlike Kosovo, Krajina did not have an immediate institutional predecessor 
and the name referred to the Habsburg Military Frontier (Vojna Krajina), a multi-ethnic 
territory with a distinct legal and administrative personality existing from the mid-16th 
century to the late 19th century. In 1990, the nationalist leaders and heads of a few 
municipalities in the Dalmatian Association of Municipalities formed a new 
association with a Serb ethnic majority.80 Even if in its initial phases the Krajina project 
was not secessionist per se, and sought territorial autonomy within the then existing 
legal framework, it was exclusively oriented towards one ethnicity, Serbs. The statute 
of the self-proclaimed Krajina did not formally define membership exclusively on 
ethnic principles, but a combination of residential rights of all resident građani while 
formally catering for national equality and preservation of cultural and historic 
specifics of ethnic Serbs in Croatia.81 The statute made explicit references to the 
Croatian constitution and the self-declared autonomous region being part of the 
Republic of Croatia. Despite this, some of Tuđman’s fears materialised and the Statute 
defined judiciary and policing as part of the autonomous region’s competences.82 On 
the ground, ethnically motivated violence was tolerated and encouraged by Krajina 
institutions that had been supported militarily by the Yugoslav Federal Army and 
Serbia itself. The assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina declared the 
Republic of Serb Krajina on 19 December 1991, following the Croatian parliament’s 
decision on independence, while the Statute was renamed the Constitution and made 
explicit references to ethnic membership.83 In February 1992, the Krajina authorities 
declared independence from Croatia although it was never recognised by any 
international subject. The self-declared republic also introduced its own formal 
citizenship. The criteria were (at least formally) residential and all SFRY citizens could 
have become Krajina citizens based on their residence and written application within 
six months from the adoption of the law.84 The self-proclaimed statelet’s existence was 
ended by the Croatian military action in 1995 that also ethnically cleansed the area.85 
                                                 
 
80 It must be noted that Northern Dalmatia and the earlier mentioned Eastern Slavonia that were part 
of the self-proclaimed Republic of Srpska Krajina never constituted an integral part of the historic 
Vojna Krajina (See Map 7). At the same time, the Krajina Serb political leaders did not claim areas that 
used to belong to the historic Krajina but had a strong Croat majority, being primarily driven by the 
exclusive ethnic logic of political territory formation. 
81 Articles 1 and 3, Statut Srpske autonomne oblasti Krajine, 21 December 1990. 
82  Ibid., Article 9. 
83 Ustav Republike Srpske Krajine [Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina], defines it as a 
“nation-state of the Serb people and all citizens” (Article 1).  
84 Article 24, Zakon o državljanstvu Republike Srpske Krajine, 21 March 1992.  
85 ICTY Judgement, Case: IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011. 
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 The Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded in 
early 1992, (following the refusal of ethnic Serb politicians in BiH to endorse the 
referendum on the independence of BiH) later to be renamed Republika Srpska (RS). Its 
first constitution adopted in February 1992 defines it as the state of Serb narod86 
without any reference to other ethnic groups or građani. Its territory was defined as 
the areas of Serb ethnic units including the areas where genocide was committed 
against Serb narod87 (alluding to the WWII victims). By using these references, the 
polity was not only to be constructed in an ethno-territorial way but was also 
projected into the past. This was a rather extreme formulation that corresponded to a 
great extent with the political aims of separation from BiH and ethnic exclusiveness of 
membership in that polity. The constitution also claimed that the RS was a part of the 
federal Yugoslav state and that citizens of RS were also citizens of Yugoslavia (neither 
of these were ever implemented). BiH and its citizenship were not mentioned, only 
that the RS can enter unions with state formations of other constitutive narodi of BiH. 
Membership and ethically- constitutive stories revolved around ethnic Serbs and 
Yugoslavia while the BiH polity was consciously ignored and does not feature there. 
The post-Dayton RS constitution acknowledged the existence of the BiH state and its 
constitution. It also included references to all of its citizens and Serbs primarily being 
defined as the state of Serb narod and all its citizens. In 2000 the BiH constitutional 
court issued a ruling that made all sub-state entities formally belong to all three main 
ethnic groups. Thus, in some respects, the post-1995 and especially post-2000 RS could 
fit into the category of imposed multi-ethnic polities. The powers the RS enjoys are 
significant; internally it is organised as a unitary polity with municipalities as the only 
lower level territorial institution. Its territorial structure reflects the ethnic 
composition of RS which was significantly homogenised as a result of ethnic cleansing 
and resettlement. Also, there is significant support among the residents of this entity 
for separation or secession, and a general lack of political identification with BiH 
expressed in opinion polls,88 frequently invigorated by the ethnic 
entrepreneurs/political elites.  
 Another similar wartime exclusive ethnic project in BiH was the creation of the 
municipalities with a dominant ethnic Croat population. The establishment of the 
Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (Herceg-Bosna) in November 1991, and supported 
by the Republic of Croatia, had the clear intention of seceding from BiH and 
eventually joining Croatia.89 Unlike RS, Herzeg-Bosnia did not enact its constitution or 
introduce its fiscal system. Rather, Croatian currency was used while the majority of 
Herzeg-Bosnia residents became formally Croatian citizens. Just as in the RS, the aim 
was to separate what was perceived to constitute ethnically Croat territories from the 
                                                 
 
86 Article 1., Ustav Republike Srpske (February 1992).  
http://ezakonodavstvo.vladars.net/Pravni_akti/Ustav%20precisceni%20tekst%2021_92%2021-92.pdf  
87  Article 2, ibid. 
88  See for example UNDP Early Warning Systems Reports (2001) and Early Warning System (2010). 
89 ICTY, Case No. IT-98-34-T, 31 March 2003. 
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state of BiH. Herzeg-Bosnia formally ceased to exist with the establishment of the 
FBiH in 1994, but symbolically, and in some ways practically, its legacy is still present. 
Specifically, two of the cantons, West Herzegovina and Canton 10 (Livno), still use the 
flags of Herzeg-Bosnia with clear ethnic markers. The cantonal executives self-
proclaim to be županije instead of cantons (with clear allusions to Croatian counties) 
and do not include references to Serbs and Others in their constitutions despite the 
fact that this clashes with the BiH and FBiH founding documents, and is thus 
unconstitutional. Recurring demands for the establishment of the third, ethnic Croat 
entity are complementary to this logic. 
 The last case of a separatist meso-level polity similar to the above includes the 
four Serb dominated North Kosovo90 municipalities that form a particular regional 
unit. The Kosovan government does not exercise sovereignty (in the Weberian sense) 
over that part of the territory and instead many of the institutions of the Republic of 
Serbia exists in its place. These institutions are not only limited to education and 
health care but also include judiciary and some elements of state security. Individual 
citizens otherwise enjoy the same rights as Serbian resident citizens, save for visa-free 
travel to Schengen agreement countries91. Some have suggested North Kosovo is or 
could be established as a type of (quasi)-condominium92 but in many ways it is a no-
man’s land, as for example neither Kosovan nor Serbian taxes are collected in the area. 
It has been proposed that the North Kosovo municipalities might be given regional 
territorial autonomy within Kosovo93, but agreement among the relevant parties 
might not be so easily reached.  
 In all of the cases there were prominent ethnic cleansing and/or denial of 
substantial citizenship to members of other ethnic groups. By definition (being 
secessionist) not only is the legitimacy of the state put into question, but also the 
principle of accommodation of contesting ethnic interests by nested citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
90  It is worth noting that most of North Kosovo including the city of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë, during most 
of  the Ottoman era belonged to the Sanjak of Novi Pazar administrative unit. Today’s borders of 
Kosovo (in the North) with Serbia Proper were established in 1959 when some of the territories 
previously belonging to the Raška municipality in Serbia Proper were transferred to Kosovo and 
Metohija. However, historic distinctness is rarely used as political argument in favour of exit options, 
instead, ethnicity based arguments dominate. 
91 See Simonida Kacarska, “Visa liberalisation as a tool of Europeanisation in the Western Balkans 
What role for citizens’ rights?” CITSEE Working Paper Series, 2012/21. 
92 Hans Binnendijk (et al.), Solutions for Northern Kosovo: Lessons Learnt in Mostar, Eastern Slavonia and 
Brčko (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2006).  
93 Stefan Lehne, “Kosovo and Serbia: Toward a Normal Relationship.” (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2012). 
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Table 1. Sub-state polities 
 
 
*5 – (partially recognised) state; 4- constitutive entity of the state; 3- (limited) regional 
autonomy; 2- de facto regional autonomy (statute); 1- local autonomy (self-
government); 0- no territory-specific political institutions; x- (quasi)condominium; y – 
cultural (non-territorial) autonomy, co-optation; z – undefined status, overlapping 
and parallel jurisdiction  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Although this paper provides a general overview and mapping of citizenship 
regimes as regards membership in state and sub-state polities, many issues and 
possibly some cases were neglected. However, one can observe certain tendencies in 
defining membership and establishing polities in the two decades following the 
initial break-up of the Yugoslav federation. 
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Herzeg-Bosnia 0/(3) 
North Kosovo z 
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First of all, ethnic principles of membership in territorial polities were 
dominant at both state and sub-state levels. The logic of territory owned by a 
particular ethnic group was omnipresent. This contributed to a zero-sum logic that 
inevitably produced the same majority-minority problem it was supposed to 
alleviate in the first place, just with reversed roles. We can see in the cases of BiH, 
Kosovo and Krajina that outcomes of this zero-sum ethnic logic are highly 
unpredictable and can have disastrous effects. Creation of sub-state polities was 
often considered a necessity in the post-conflict period and served to segregate 
ethnic groups rather than being a genuine tool for territorial management of diverse 
territories. Post-Yugoslav ethnically legitimised nation-states also shied away from 
institutionalising minority meso-level polities in both the 1990s and 2000s. 
The main problem of equating polities with ethno-majoritarian territories is 
their unidimensionality. This is especially true for those polities without historical 
precedents or a strong functional logic that would underpin the territorial 
boundaries. This, as some of the cases illustrate, can cause numerous problems for 
the viability of these polities and cement ethnicity as the only criterion defining 
political membership as well as rights in the long run.  
There are cases in which the logic of civic rather than ethnic membership was 
imposed. The case of Brčko’s multi-ethnic polity shows that the political rights of its 
citizens in the state-wide polity are still tied to ethnic membership which exhibits 
elements of democratic deficit and underscores the problems that highly ethnicised 
complex states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to face.  
Nevertheless, there are cases of bottom-up territorial projects that defined 
membership on territorial (and civic) principles and in which constitutive stories are 
multi-ethnic. Some, like the Dalmatian regionalist political project were fiercely 
suppressed, especially in the 1990s. The more successful cases of Vojvodina and 
Istria in the 2000s demonstrate that the impetus for the (re)construction of a sub-state 
polity need not be based solely on the demands of a single ethnic group in a given 
space, but can instead be derived from overlapping interests (historic, functional and 
inter-ethnic) in various constellations. This point lends some support to Weller’s 
claim that territorial “self-governance settlements will only take root if independence 
has been firmly precluded as a potential option”94, while being challenged by 
centralist nationalists. The last two cases also challenge the zero-sum logic of 
exclusive ethno-territorial polities. They also illustrate that nested citizenship 
regimes are possible in post-Yugoslav space, even if memberships in nesting and 
nested polities are differently conceptualised.  
 
                                                 
 
94 Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.), Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution. (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2005), p.72. 
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ADDENDUM 
 
Map 1. 
Counties of Croatia including Istria and 
Dalmatia   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2. 
AP Vojvodina and Sandžak in Serbia 
 
 
Map 3. 
Territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina (entities and Brčko District) 
 
 
 
CITSEE WORKING PAPER SERIES 2012/22 
  
 
 
34 
Map 4. 
Municipalities of Macedonia 
 
(Source: Wikipedia) 
 
 
Map 5. Municipalities in Kosovo 
(ethnic majorities) 
 
(Source:OSCE) 
 
 
Map 6. Newly formed Gračanica/ 
Graçanicë municipality (in Kosovo) 
with ethnic Serb majority 
 
 
(Source:ECMI
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Map 7.  “Republic of Serbian Krajina” 
in 1992 and historic Krajina (right)  
 
(Source: UNEP) 
 
 
Map 8. Herceg-Bosnia in 1992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Wikipedia) 
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